It is clear that the Iranian opposition failed on February 11 to demonstrate its strength to the world, even though they have done it before. However, that was not because the opposition no longer exists, or because the people of Iran care more about the nuclear power issue, or that the security forces were just too numerous.

It should have become obvious to the opposition weeks ago that the time has come to shift their tactics. They must move beyond just trying to seize important days of the calendar like the mourning day of Ashura in December or the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution on February 11 as their only way of displaying their strength.

Using symbolic dates like this to make the point that people are dissatisfied with the regime is just one of many possible tools but by no means does it amount to a strategy.

As in the cinema, you can only get by on clichéd imagery for so long before people start to question their faith in your work. The opposition movement in Iran faces the same crisis; their story is underdeveloped and the actors are well past their prime. To save this production they need to re-write the script.

The Green Movement leaders seem unable to decide whether they believe the Islamic Republic should continue or not.

One of its leaders, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, has been very clear on his attachment to the system he helped found as he showed in his January 27 statement, “I feel the need to emphasise the Islamic and national identity of the Green Movement, its opposition to foreign rule, and its loyalty to our constitution.”

That is despite the fact that a great many of those supporting this movement define themselves without any reference to Islam, and many more are openly against the religion and its place in government.

The inconsistency in the demands of the Green Movement was recently illustrated in a Der Spiegel interview with one of its leaders, Mehdi Karroubi.

On the one hand, Karroubi said he wants to celebrate the system he helped create, “Just as in every year since the revolution of 1979, I will participate again this time. I will join the sea of people somewhere.”

On the other, however, he implicitly asks his supporters to do what he is not willing to do himself: keep questioning the system.

“When there is a large demonstration, people come together who have different points of view. Some are correct while some are misguided and wrong. Some people, like me, do not recognise the government,” he said.

A more confident and mature leadership would quietly take responsibility for its deficiencies and mistakes, learn from them and re-group, but this is not something we will ever see from the current crop of Iranian opposition voices, and ultimately it is the fatal flaw of the group and those who follow it.

A new Iranian paradigm needs to be created, and ultimately that is what this movement was supposed to be about, but somehow it lost its way and chose brand name leaders with chequered pasts.

Not one of the individuals currently vying to lead the Iranian opposition—either domestically or abroad—has clean hands. None has been bold enough to mention abolishing the theocratic system, although privately it is quite possibly what they would all like to see happen. Perhaps this hypocrisy is why February 11 was a failure.

The fact is the greens should have sat this one out. After the Ashura protests in December they felt confident in their ability to generate crowds, but as the revolution anniversary approached, a repeat performance seemed unlikely.

For starters there was no well-disseminated plan as in earlier protests, which were spread virally through social media, text messages and word of mouth. Last Wednesday, just 24 hours before the event, people were still asking each other where they were supposed to go. Their leaders did not offer much help; Karroubi told Der Spiegel, “We do not decide which approach the protesters take or what they do.”

Still, the regime was clearly nervous as indicated by the massive security presence. Ahead of the day, many statements were issued by various police, Revolutionary Guards commanders and clerics about the importance of the day. Some made preposterous claims, like forecasting that 50 million people would take part.

The official events in Azadi Square were some of the least well attended in the history of the Islamic Republic. Unfortunately for the Green Movement, however, the regime was able to successfully control the spin on the day.

The ability to confuse and catch the other side off balance has been the defining tactic in this struggle and it has often worked for the Green Movement. This time around the regime gambled that a massive show of (potential) force would be enough to take the day. Still, it is unclear whether the regime would be able to consistently mount such displays of strength should the opposition continue to take to the streets.

The defects evident in the opposition strategies can no longer be pushed aside; they need to be analysed and integrated into future plans. Furthermore, without a clearer and more realistic vision of what a post-Islamic Republic system might look like, the hypocrisy and corruption that have been such a pervasive hallmark of the Iranian leadership for most of the nation’s modern history is likely to continue, regardless of who is in charge.